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Introduction
Community participation has long been thought of as an important component of service delivery and provision of public goods. Between 2002 and 2012, for example, the World Bank allocated over $85 billion to local participatory development (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) . Development practitioners have argued that engaging the community in development projects will create a closer connection between those who distribute funds and its intended beneficiaries. An engaged community will not only hold the government accountable, but also influence decisions that directly affect their lives. This can result in tangible improvements in the types of, quality, and access to government services (Bardhan, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Desai and Joshi, 2014; Rao and Ibanez, 2005; Wong, 2012) .
However, programs with community participation can falter when a subgroup is able to mobilise to further their self-interest to the detriment of the rest of the community. These subgroups may have greater information and power over decision-making, leading to potential theft and corruption. This can significantly affect the provision of public goods in these communities. This appropriation is often to the detriment of minorities and disadvantaged groups such as women who often have little voice or authority within the community. Indeed, (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) point out that local participation in community development programs is often driven by wealthier, more educated, male participants with higher social status. These factors often imply that benefits from such programs bypass women as well as other marginalized sections of the community.
This dynamic is particularly important in the context of India where gender inequality is particularly stark. Despite two decades of rapid economic growth and social transformation, women in India fare considerably worse than men. Sex selective abortions, disparity in education and healthcare provision, and unequal access to economic opportunities are common, especially in rural areas of the country. For example, consider the difference in educational outcomes: while boys and girls have almost equal enrolment at the primary level and the start of secondary school, only 73 girls enrol in tertiary school for every 100 boys. Women tend to marry young and have children quickly, and face persistent barriers to mobility outside the home, labor force participation, and career development.
Community based programs have the potential to alleviate gender inequality, but only when they encourage female participation in decision making processes, thereby increasing women's control over economic resources, leading to greater accountability, better social relationships and changed gender norms (World Bank, 2015) . As a result policy makers have introduced targeted community programs with the specific aim of empowering women as alternatives to both quotas and standard community-based programs. 1 At the same time, mutual trust and cooperation are crucial for economic development.
Trust reduces transaction costs and is directly linked to social capital (Fafchamps, 2006) . Economic interactions particularly in developing countries where law enforcement is weak, rely on trust to facilitate interactions and trade. Indeed, Arrow (1972) states that "virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust. It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual confidence." These factors suggest that citizens' trust in other citizens is a key component in economic and social development. Therefore, measuring the impact on trust and other behavioral factors is important from the perspective of policymakers examining community development programs and policies. Yet the academic literature has paid little attention to developing methods for such measurement and virtually no program systematically collects data on its behavioral implications. This paper asks how do participatory programs that specifically target women affect community trust and cohesion? The long term success of community based programs might depend critically on the behavioral transformation that they generate, but the answer is not straightforward as an empirical matter. If the program is associated with greater trust among both men and women, then the entire community moves towards 'good' equilibria with benefits beyond the program. Conversely, the targeted nature of the program might generate negative behavioral reactions, which reduces social capital and potentially destroys long term economic and social relationships. Given this theoretical ambiguity, our main contribution is to use a unique field experiment to examine the behavioral response to a participatory program and in particular the behavioral response towards women. The effects of this program on behavioral characteristics such as trust and trustworthiness is an open empirical question. 2 We examine this question in the context of the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project, or JEEViKA, undertaken by the Government of Bihar and the World Bank. The program is designed specifically to empower rural women, both socially and economically, through the creation of self-managed community microfinance institutions, greater access to social protection (including food security) and a greater community voice.
3 Our field experiment involves a trust task conducted in both JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages, we compare if program villages exhibit differences on measures of trust and trustworthiness.
We conduct field experiments to understand the relationship between community development programs and behavioral transformation. Given the explicit gender targeting of the JEEViKA program, our field experiment is designed to account for gender differences in behavioral responses. The field experiments and respondent surveys were conducted among 960 participants from 40 villages in Bihar in 2014. JEEViKA was operational in 20 of these villages and not in the remaining 20 villages. The format of the field experiment allows subjects to be randomized into groups, hence reducing selection bias and enabling causal inference. In addition to the experiments, we collected extensive individual and community-level survey data to understand experiences with JEEViKA and attitudes towards women.
Our central finding is that women in JEEViKA villages are significantly more trusting and more trusted than in non-JEEViKA villages, a result perhaps of participating in the community activities that are at the core of the program. Simultaneously, our regression results do not reveal any differences in trustworthiness among women in the JEEViKA villages. Thus, the experimental results suggest that the JEEViKA program is positively associated with trust by and towards women, but cannot conclude that the program comprehensively affected other types of community behavior.
Surveys of the experimental participants reveal greater aspirations for their children's education among JEEViKA village residents, and lower desire for girls to enter traditional female occupations. In addition, men in JEEViKA villages are more likely to appreciate the value of women in leadership roles. These findings suggest that the experimental findings on increased trust are also correlated with other attitudinal changes that can translate into long term women's empowerment and economic development.
The JEEViKA Program
The Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project (or "JEEViKA") is a poverty reduction program undertaken by the Government of Bihar and the World Bank. The program aims to socially and economically empower the rural poor by focusing on women. It focuses on creating sustainable livelihoods through self-managed community institutions, improved access to social protection (including food security) and greater community voice.
The main instrument to achieve these aims are women's community-based self-help groups (SHG) that provide a mechanism for savings and borrowing. 4 The objective is that over time and with regular repayments these groups will become self sustaining organizations. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in four villages in rural Bihar, Sanyal et al. (2015) find that JEEViKA's focus on women's empowerment created new "cultural configurations"
and broke down normative restrictions on gender roles. These researchers argue that the program not only offered women access to physical resources such as credit, but also a new social identity of SHG member (distinct from identities of caste, religion or ethnicity). In addition, membership in JEEViKA meant that women were participating in new institutional environments, thereby gaining access to knowledge, skills and social networks outside their traditional domain. Thus, programs such as JEEViKA can have a transformative social effect beyond the direct economic impact. In the long run, these direct effects can change social norms (for instance, whether to trust women in financial transactions) in a way that fundamentally change the nature of economic relationships.
Experimental design
We investigate the extent to which participant behavior in experiments is influenced by perceptions or experience with the JEEViKA program. Harrison and List (2004) argue that one of the advantages of artefactual field experiments is that participants bring their prior ideas and experiences from everyday life into the experimental sessions which might in turn shape their behaviour. Our experimental sessions were conducted in 40 villages in three districts of Bihar, 20 of which were JEEViKA villages and 20 of which were not.
A total of 955 villagers from different sections of the village society participated in the experimental sessions. We discuss results from two experiments -a trust game, and a risk game that was embedded in the post-experiment survey. 6 In addition to the experiments, we collected extensive individual and community-level survey data to understand experiences with JEEViKA and other development programs. The rest of this section briefly describes the details of the experimental design.
Trust task
The first task in the artefactual field experiment is based on the trust (or investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) . We implement a one-shot version of the game to avoid reputation and learning effects and to avoid subject fatigue. The Trust task is a two-player game in which players are randomly assigned one of two roles: a Trustor or a Trustee. Each participant is given an initial endowment of E. Each Trustor is asked to decide to transfer any part of this endowment, S to an anonymous Trustee (S ∈ [0, E]). The experimenter triples this S and gives it to the matched Trustee, who in turn is asked to choose whether to transfer any money out of E + 3S back to the Trustor. So the payoff for the Trustor is E − S + R where R is the amount returned by the Trustee; the corresponding payoff for the Trustee is
The resolution of this game using backward induction is simple. In a one-shot version of the game, the Trustee should not return any money knowing that the game ends immediately thereafter. The Trustor, anticipating the Trustee's decision, should send no money to the Trustee in the first place. However, actual behavior is often quite different from the one predicted by theory. In this task, any transfer made by the Trustor to the anonymous Trustee can be interpreted as a measure of trust and any amount returned by the Trustee is a measure of trustworthiness.
The strategy method is used to obtain the trustee decisions. To do this, the Trustee is asked to specify an amount to return R(S ) for every possible amount of S chosen by the Trustor.
We restrict S to specific integer amounts. In all sessions, participants are given instruction sheets with own gender symbols on the front page making gender prominent. JEEViKA and Non-JEEViKA villages were randomly assigned to one of two treatments either the control (gender not revealed) or treatment (gender revealed). In the control the gender of the partner was not revealed; in the gender revealed treatment, the gender of the participant's partner is revealed. This was done prior to the participant making his or her decision. 
Risk game
A risk task similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997) was embedded in the survey. In the risk task, each player was given the option of investing any part of an initial endowment of INR 20 in a hypothetical risky project that had a 50% chance of tripling the amount invested; alternatively the amount invested could be lost with a 50% probability. The individual could keep any amount he/she chose not to invest. The amount invested provides a measure of risk preference. A higher amount invested in the riskier option indicates that the participant is risk loving. This risk preference could be used to control for the possible confound caused by risk on the amount sent by the trustor in the Trust task. All subjects 7 INR is the currency of India. At the time of conducting the experimental sessions, 1 USD = INR 55. 8 Recent studies have demonstrated that priming gender, ethnicity or religion can cause changes in the behaviour of experimental participants (Benjamin et al., 2010; Burns, 2012; Chen et al., 2014) . were paid for this task.
4 Setting and procedure
Location and village selection
In this section we describe the setting of the experiment, the methods used to select villages for our study and the recruitment of participants from these villages. Finally, we describe the procedures for surveying individuals and the local community.
The artefactual field experiment were conducted in the villages of Bihar, India. Specifically, our data was collected from 40 villages in the districts of Gaya, Madhubani and Khagaria, which are approximately equidistant from the capital city of Patna.
9 Figure 1 presents more information on the location of the experimental sessions. Almost 10% of India's population resides in Bihar, which is characterized by substantial gender inequality. Bihar is also one of the fastest growing states in India with an average GDP growth of 10% between 2010 and 2014.
Using a list of villages provided by the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project (BRLP) and corresponding characteristics from the 2011 Census of India, we randomly chose 40 villages in Gaya, Khagaria and Madhubani districts. Only one session was conducted in each village to prevent information spillovers across sessions, which could result in considerable loss of experimental control and precision. Column 1 in Table 1 presents the average village level characteristics for the full sample. The villages, on average, consist of 566 households, with an average of 5 members per household. 33% of the households in these villages belong to Scheduled Castes. The average literacy rate is around 44%, though men Our analysis does not attempt to make inferences based on the average village in Bihar;
instead we compare JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages within the selected sample.
We use an identical method and criteria to select JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages in the experimental sample. We randomly selected 20 villages from 5 blocks in Gaya, Madhubani and Khagaria where the JEEViKA project had been implemented. We call these the JEEViKA villages. Next, these villages were matched with 20 villages in 12 blocks that were similar in terms of observable characteristics from the 2011 census data to the JEEViKA villages selected, except the program was not implemented in these villages.
We call these non-JEEViKA villages. Thus, non-JEEViKA villages are not a random subset of the universe of villages where the JEEViKA program was not implemented. Rather, they were chosen from similar blocks in the three districts where the JEEViKA program was implemented. Columns 2-4 of 
Participant recruiting
To recruit participants for the experiment, a male and a female member of the research team visited each village the day before the session was scheduled in that village. They 
Procedure
Each village had approximately 24 participants. 10 Upon arrival, participants were screened for eligibility, then their names were recorded on a participant list. Once seated, they were given stationary and, at random, a number tag representing their ID. The experimenter read aloud instructions to establish common knowledge. To determine whether subjects understood the instructions, each participant answered a set of control questions in private before the experiment commenced. The experimenter cross-checked answers and started the experiment once satisfied that all subjects understood the task. No communication was allowed during the session. The instructions were read aloud in Hindi.
11
Visual descriptions of the tasks were also displayed while reading out the instructions.
The survey questions were administered by research assistants. An analysis of responses indicates that there are no differences depending on the gender of the research assistant administering the questions.
All subjects participated in the trust task, then the public goods task followed by the postexperiment survey. In the survey, each participant answered questions on aspirations for their children, attitudes towards women and towards female leaders, in additional to questions on individual and household level demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
The tasks were always run in the same order (i.e., the trust task followed by the public goods task), no feedback was provided to the subjects in between the two tasks and subjects were paid on the basis of the outcomes in one of the two tasks, randomly determined after the post experiment survey had been conducted. The only task that subjects received any feedback for was the one for which they were paid. Paying for one task helps reduce wealth effects. The average payout to participants was INR 420, or approximately two days wage for a semi-skilled laborer in Bihar. Including the post-experiment surveys, each session lasted on average for four hours. Data was entered twice and subsequently checked and reconciled by two different research assistants. The results were compared against hard copies in case of inconsistencies.
Descriptive statistics
Column 1 in Table 2 presents the means for a number of participant characteristics. The average participant is 27 years old, from a household with 7.8 members and predomi- 11 The instructions were first prepared in English, and then translated into Hindi by a native Hindi speaker. The English and Hindi versions were compared and verified for consistency by a person fluent in both Hindi and English. Columns 5 and 6 present the means of the observable characteristics on the basis of whether the participant was assigned the role of trustor or trustee. The differences presented in column 7 do not show any statistically significant differences between participants assigned roles of trustors versus trustees on observed individual level characteristics.
To examine whether the random assignment of participants to treatments was effectively implemented, Columns 8, 9 and 10 report differences in participant characteristics by treatment. For most characteristics, there are only minor differences across individuals assigned to the two treatments. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics by gender on the key outcome variables. Panel A presents the averages for the trust task. Columns 1 and 2 present the means separately for the male and female participants in all villages and column 3 the gender difference.
Results
Overall, men are significantly more trusting than women: they send a significantly higher amount as trustors (p-value of difference = 0.05). This is driven by behavior in the nonJEEViKA villages. (Columns 7-9) show that men exhibit significantly greater trust in these villages. However, due to a sharp increase in trust by female trustors and a slight decrease in trust by male trustors, we do not detect significant behavioral differences by gender in the JEEViKA villages. We return to this issue later when we discuss the regression results relating to trust behavior.
While amount sent to female trustees is always higher than the amount sent to male trustees (by the average participant), the gender difference is not statistically significant.
Similarly, there is no gender difference in trustworthiness.
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics on risk preferences, which is defined as the proportion allocated to the risky asset in the risk task. Men have a significantly greater preference for risk in the overall sample (+0.10, p < 0.01), as well as in the JEEViKA (+0.12, p < 0.01) and non-JEEViKA villages (+0.08, p < 0.05). In our trust regressions, below, we control for the risk preferences of the participants so that regression results are not confounded by differences in risk preferences.
JEEViKA and attitude differences
JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages display little difference in perceptions about the appropriate occupation and education aspirations of male and female children and the appropriateness of women in positions of power (see Table 4 ). However, respondents in JEEViKA villages are significantly more likely to strongly agree with the following two statements: (1) "villages where women have more power perform better", and (2) "in this village women have too much political influence".
Exposure to the JEEViKA program is associated with a significant difference in attitudes of both men and women. Male respondents in JEEViKA villages have higher aspirations for their daughters than their non-JEEViKA counterparts: they are less likely to want their daughters to be employed in a traditional female occupation (housewife, teacher or preschool teachers) and they are more likely to report that they would prefer their daughters to select the occupation they prefer. Men in JEEViKA villages are also significantly more likely to agree with the statement "villages with women in power perform better".
Compared to their non-JEEViKA counterparts, women in JEEViKA villages are more likely to aspire for tertiary education for their children (+0.077, p < 0.10), perhaps because the value of education is more readily understood as a result of the JEEViKA program. Women also report feeling safer in JEEViKA villages (+0.070, p < 0.10), which is important given widespread violence against women in this region. However, women are significantly more likely to report barriers against women in leadership positions (+0.081, p < 0.10), perhaps because leadership opportunities created by the JEEViKA program also allow barriers to manifest.
Trust and trustworthiness
In this section we examine the effects of exposure to the JEEViKA program on participant trust and trustworthiness in more detail. Recall that in the trust task (Section 3.1), the amount sent by the trustor is interpreted as a measure of trust while the amount returned by the trustee is a measure of trustworthiness. First, we examine whether women are more trusting, particulary after experience with the JEEViKA program, using the following regression equation.
where S iv is the amount sent by trustor i who is a resident of village v in the trust task.
T rustor f is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trustor is female; JEEViKA v denotes that the JEEViKA program was implemented in village v. Recall that trustors and trustees both reside in the same village, but matching was anonymous -trustors did not know the identity of the matched trustee and vice versa. Finally, X iv includes a set of individual controls -age, educational attainment, occupational status, income, religion, caste, household size, father's school completion and the proportion of the endowment allocated to the risky asset in the risk task described in Section 3.2. The regressions also control for a set of district fixed effects that account for all district level unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
12 Table 5 presents regression results on trust from estimation of equation (1). The regression results presented in Column 1 imply that female trustors exhibit significantly more trust compared to male trustors in JEEViKA villages (+21.97, p < 0.05). In non-JEEViKA villages, women are significantly less trusting than men and exposure to the JEEViKA program is associated with a significant increase in trust by women.
Columns 2 and 3 present the trust results separately for the gender revealed and gender not revealed villages. The result that females in JEEViKA villages exhibit significantly higher levels of trust is true only in the gender revealed villages (+33.67, p < 0.05). Table 6 examines gender differences in being trusted by reporting coefficients from estimation of a variant of equation (1).
In this equation, T rustee f and T rustee m are dummies for the gender of the trustee.
13
The regression results presented in Column 1 imply that on average, relative to when the gender of the trustee is not revealed, female (but not male) trustees are significantly more trusted (+14.756, p < 0.05). The results in Column 2 decompose the effects by the JEEViKA status of the village. As the total effects imply, women are more trusted only in
JEEViKA villages (+16.49, p < 0.10).
In summary, the findings in Tables 5 and 6 imply that women exposed to the JEEViKA program are both more trusting and more trusted. Next, we examine whether women are more likely to reciprocate this trust (i.e., whether they are more trustworthy), and if exposure to the JEEViKA program affects this by estimating the following regression.
where R iv is the average proportion returned by the trustee. 14 Z iv includes a set of individual controls such as age, educational attainment, occupational status, income, religion, caste, household size, father's school completion as well as a set of block fixed effects that account for all block (or sub-district) level unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 15 Table 7 shows no statistically significant differences in trustworthiness by gender or exposure to the JEEViKA program. 13 The reference category is that the gender of the matched trustee is not known to the trustor. 14 The proportion returned by the trustee is defined by
, where E is the endowment of the trustee and S is the amount sent by the trustor, which is tripled by the experimenter. Recall that we collect information on R for all possible values of E (i.e., use the strategy method), the average proportion returned is the average over all the decisions made by the trustees. 15 Our results remain unchanged when pooling the reported R for each trustee over the different values of S and cluster the standard errors at the individual level.
Conclusion
A 2009 report by the World Bank, FAO and IFAD offered evidence that community participatory programs can and often bypass women (World Bank, FAO and IFAD, 2009 ).
Women focused community participatory programs such as JEEViKA have significant potential to empower women leading to long term community development. These programs can work by increasing women's skills, bargaining power and ultimately change perceptions about the appropriate role of women in the community (Ahmed et al., 2009 ).
By measuring differences in trust and other attitudes in JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages, our research offers an important new dimension on which to evaluate communitybased programs. We find evidence of significant differences in the behaviour and attitudes towards women in program villages. Specifically, we find that the program is associated with an improvement in trust, first among women and subsequently reciprocated by men they interact with. Trust in fellow community members is a key driver of community cooperation, without trust community driven programs may be less effective. The program is associated with changes in attitudes of men away from the traditional role and expectation of women. The finding compliment existing survey research on the JEEViKA program that find women's empowerment measured in terms of mobility and decision making improves for those women participating in the program (Datta, 2015) . In addition, Sanyal et al. (2015) find that the JEEViKA program changes cultural norms towards women by giving women access to new networks and increasing knowledge.
These findings should be accompanied with a few caveats. Given that the original JEEViKA blocks were not randomly selected, it is possible that despite our method of selec- Finally, the results presented in this paper are in contrast to the experiences of many community programs which have been found to ignore the voice of women (Wong, 2012) .
In many developing countries, women's voice is marginalised and untargeted community programs that leave decision making to elites within a community will not change this aspect. For participatory community programs to be beneficial for all social groups, policy makers should ensure that community programs explicitly target women, apart from other objectives. 
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